Avec "Pathosophie", Viktor von Weizsäcker construit une nouvelle anthropologie dans laquelle la dimension passionnelle et pathique de l'homme est à la fois la base et l'origine d'une médecine repensée de pied en cap. A partir de la destinée pathosophique de l'homme, il fonde un tout autre système afin de pouvoir penser les rapports entre différentes maladies, qu'il expose dans une double triade: névrose-biose-sclérose, organose-somatose-psychose. Ce système se déploie non à l'intérieur de lui-même mais dans la relation médecin-malade, fondée sur la (...) biographie et qui prend forme dans les pathographies. Le détour par la pathographie, à laquelle Viktor Von Weizsäcker a consacré sa vie, transforme tout ce qui peut devenir système en encyclopédie. Viktor von Weizsäcker invite à faire le tour des thèmes fondamentaux de l'existence pathique (la douleur, la volonté, la sexualité, la conscience, l'Etat, le pouvoir, le mensonge, le vertige, l'ennui et la mort) et, ainsi, fait entendre plusieurs voix dans une cohérence polyphonique. Le mode de pensée encyclopédique avec ses foyers de concepts forme un paysage qui apparaît lorsque nous nous y mouvons et Viktor von Weizsäcker nous le fait sentir au lieu de nous le prouver. Selon Jacques Schotte, nous avons à penser plus avant les formulations de Viktor von Weizsäcker si "nous voulons guérir et nous guérir, c'est-à-dire vivre davantage". Comme le proclame Hölderlin: "C'est celui qui a pensé le plus profond qui aime le plus vivant". (shrink)

Scientists cannot take a neutral position regarding the way progress evolves. The environment, social justice and international order are the key factors for constructing peace.

Information can be conceived as being composed of two complementary components: novelty and confirmation. Whenever either of the two is zero, information is zero. Genetic information, too, requires both novelty and confirmation. Evolution can be seen as the history of diversification. Selection alone reduces diversity. Recessivity appears to serve as a mechanism to protect diversity against selection. So does the geographical and behavioral 'separation' of species. Both recessivity and separation can be seen as 'error-friendly', a broader concept that is supportive (...) of diversity, learning and further evolution. This concept should also be obeyed in technological applications. (shrink)

1. Realism. Physicists claim rightly to speak about reality. But what does “reality” mean?2. The Copenhagen Interpretation (CI). We consider CI as a minimal semantics for quantum theory, leaving ways open for additional interpretation.3. The Measuring Process. Several interpretations of the process as given in the liteature are discussed.4. Realistic Interpretation. Discussion of the de Broglie-Bohm-Bell interpretation. If well formulated, it is not a necessary consequence of quantum theory but cannot be excluded.

What does it mean for ethics to say, as Wittgenstein did, that philosophy “leaves everything as it is”? -/- Though clearly absorbed with ethical questions throughout his life and work, Wittgenstein's remarks about the subject do not easily lend themselves to summation or theorizing. Although many moral philosophers cite the influence or inspiration of Wittgenstein, there is little agreement about precisely what it means to do ethics in the light of Wittgenstein. -/- Ethics after Wittgenstein brings together an international cohort (...) of leading scholars in the field to address this problem. The chapters advance a conception of philosophical ethics characterized by an attention to detail, meaning and importance which itself makes ethical demands on its practitioners. Working in conversation with literature and film, engaging deeply with anthropology and critical theory, and addressing contemporary problems from racialized sexual violence against women to the Islamic State, these contributors reclaim Wittgenstein's legacy as an indispensable resource for contemporary ethics. (shrink)

Von philologischer Nüchternheit und humanistischem Engagement... Der Band dokumentiert exemplarisch die Verbindung von Altertumswissenschaft und moderner Kulturwissenschaft auf hohem philologischem und kritisch reflektierendem Niveau.

Liebe Frau Henry! Soeben bekomme ich Ihren Brief, Die Freude, die mir Ihre Ankündigung macht, veranlaßt mich, Ihnen sofort zu antworten. Sie wissen wohl, daß ich seit Jahren wünsche, Sie möchten Ihre philosophischen Arbeiten fortsetzen und möchten die dafür notwendige Muße finden. Ich weiß nicht, ob Sie wissen, daß ich Sie mehrfach für philosophische Lehrstühle, über deren Besetzung ich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Naturphilosophie gefragt worden bin, vorgeschlagen habe.

Liebe Frau Henry! Herzlichen Dank für Ihren Brief und für die beiden Artikel Sie sind der erste Mensch, der es meiner Kenntnis nach erreicht hat, dass die Resolutionen in extenso abgedruckt wurden, und ich bin sehr froh, dass es an dieser Stelle gerade geschehen ist. Ich habe mich übrigens mit hiesigen physikalisch-mathematischen Studienräten verabredet, einmal an ihrem Unterricht teilzunehmen und dann das Problem der Stoffbeschränkung in der Physik mit ihnen zu besprechen.

Liebe Frau Henry! Auf Ihren Brief antworte ich sofort. Ihren gemeinsamen Brief an Herrn Picht und mich habe ich freilich immer noch nicht beantwortet, aber dazu braucht es mehr Gelassenheit, als mir im Moment eine etwas mir über den Kopf wachsende Reisetätigkeit gelassen hat. Nun aber zu Ihren praktischen Fragen.

Heidegger wasn’t a philosopher of science, nor a philosopher of natural science. In Carl Richard von Weizsäcker’s remark, science in Heidegger’s opinion wasn’t “the source nor the objective of his thinking”. In fact, according to Weizsäcker, the point is in mutual misunderstanding. “Until now the science hasn’t understood what Heidegger meant to say to it, while on the other hand, as it seems to me, Heidegger couldn’t thoroughly think the nature science through.” Maybe it would be more to the (...) point to say that it wasn’t just about misunderstanding, but more about Heidegger’s effort to define thinking and science in a radically new approach. The radicalism of his endeavor is, maybe, best shown in his insulting sentence : “Science doesn’t think.” That doesn’t mean only that there’s a gap between thinking and science, but also that this gap is unsurmountable. Thus, the point isn’t in any kind of an objective, but in “establishing the inner structure of science: that in its essence it is to be, on one level, in reference to what philosophy thinks, but in itself is not concerned about what it is supposed to think and forgets about it”. (shrink)

Heidegger n’était ni un philosophe de la science ni un philosophe de la science de la nature. Pour lui, la science n’était, comme l’a justement remarqué Carl Richard von Weizsäcker, « ni le point de départ ni la finalité de sa pensée ». De surcroît, selon Weizsäcker, il s’agit d’une incompréhension mutuelle : « La science, jusqu’à présent, n’a pas compris ce que Heidegger souhaitait lui dire ; à l’inverse, Heidegger, il me semble, n’a pu approfondir la science de (...) la nature. » Peut-être serait-il plus approprié de parler, non pas d’une simple incompréhension, mais de l’effort de Heidegger de déterminer la pensée et la science d’une façon radicalement novatrice. « La science ne pense pas » : cette phrase, offensante, comme l’a désignée Heidegger lui-même, illustre peut-être le mieux la radicalité de sa démarche. Non seulement elle indique qu’il existe, entre la pensée et la science, un hiatus, mais affirme, en plus, que celui-ci est infranchissable. Ce n’est pas une objection ; il s’agit en fait de « déterminer la structure intrinsèque de la science : que dans son essence, elle soit portée vers ce que pense la philosophie, sans toutefois mettre en question elle-même ce qu’il faut penser et en l’oubliant ». (shrink)

Heidegger nije bio ni filozof znanosti niti filozof prirodne znanosti. Znanost nije za njega bila, kako dobro primjećuje Carl Richard von Weizsäcker, »ni izlazište niti cilj njegova mišljenja«. Štoviše, prema Weizsäckeru, riječ je o obostranom nerazumijevanju: »Znanost do sada nije razumjela što joj je Heidegger htio reći, dok Heidegger obratno, tako mi se čini, nije mogao temeljito promisliti prirodnu znanost.« Možda bi bilo primjerenije samoj stvari reći, da nije riječ o pukom nerazumijevanju, već o naporu Heideggera da mišljenje i (...) znanost radikalno novo odredi. Radikalnost njegova poduhvata pokazuje možda najbolje uvredljiva rečenica : »Znanost ne misli.« Ona ne želi samo reći da postoji jaz između mišljenja i znanosti, već također da je on nepremostiv. Pritom nije riječ o nikakvom prigovoru, već o »utvrđivanju unutarnje strukture znanosti: da je u njezinoj biti, da je s jedne strane upućena na to, što misli filozofija, no sama se ne osvrće na to što treba misliti i zaboravlja ga.«. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Church for the World: A Theology of Public Witness by Jennifer McBrideGlen StassenThe Church for the World: A Theology of Public Witness Jennifer McBride New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 310 pp. $74.00Jennifer McBride offers the brilliant proposal that Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theme of repentance is the right ingredient for our pluralistic and democratic context, which needs a nontriumphal Christian witness. [End Page 199]My focus on confession and (...) repentance as a nontriumphal public witness is aimed... mostly at white Protestants who benefit in countless recognized and unrecognized ways from being part of the dominant culture, because this reflects my own social location and the churches and para-church groups in which I was raised. Bonhoeffer writes... from a position of social power and privilege and argues from that place that the acknowledgment of guilt is definitive for the church. My theology of public witness defines the church as the body called to repentance—as the body called, in the words of Bonhoeffer, to accept guilt or take responsibility for social sin.(9)McBride shows that “repentance” carries various connotations in Bonhoeffer’s writings. In Discipleship, he “links metanoia with the church’s conformation to the crucified Christ (a prevalent theme throughout his theology).” In Ethics, he links “repentance to the church’s this-worldly activity when he defines the church’s repentance as preparing this ‘penultimate’ world for its redemptive transformation.” In Letters and Papers from Prison, he defines metanoia as “living completely in” this world’s tasks, questions, successes and failures, experiences, and perplexities, taking seriously the suffering of God in the world (14). “As the acceptance of divine judgment, repentance participates in the unfolding of redemption. Thus, it is... energized by hope for the world and humanity, animated by joyful expectation as much as lament, and oriented toward future transformation as much as past and present sin” (107). Interpreting repentance through the person of Christ directly challenges the common understanding that repentance primarily concerns one’s individual standing before God; instead, as participation in Christ, repentance constitutes existence for others. Her interpretation is far richer and more insightful than I can represent in a short review.McBride bases her argument on three dimensions of Bonhoeffer’s theology: Christology, this-worldliness, and ecclesiology (12). By “Christology,” she is pointing to “nothing other than the crucified Christ who accepts responsibility for sin” (139). By “this-worldliness,” we can also point to Christology, in Bonhoeffer’s incarnational theme of entering into the full dimensions of human life. McBride’s ecclesiology urges “that the church’s presence in public life be conformed to Christ’s mode of being in the world” (54).In his Ethics (134–45) Bonhoeffer wrote a profound confession of his own, the churches’ and nation’s guilt that was taken up by some churches and church groups after the war’s end, and then by President Richard von Weizsäcker and Chancellor Willy Brandt. This public repentance has been the key to healing within Germany and in its relation with other nations.McBride credits Larry Rasmussen and John de Gruchy for inspiring us to develop new implications of Bonhoeffer’s theological ethics for our different contexts. So she goes “beyond Bonhoeffer with Bonhoeffer.” [End Page 200]McBride appreciates the pioneering work of Christine Schliesser, Everyone Who Acts Responsibly Becomes Guilty, for noticing that Bonhoeffer’s central concept of “acceptance of guilt has not been examined systematically by previous scholars.” She goes beyond Schliesser, emphasizing that as public witness, the church’s confession unto repentance consists of communal, more than individual, acceptance of guilt—“especially the myriad social/structural evils of our political, social, and economic systems.” She appreciates Stanley Hauerwas’s emphasis on ecclesiology but urges him to develop a theology of public witness that communicates that Christ and the church are for, not against, the world, with its pluralistic, not monolithic, culture. She appreciates Jim Wallis’s Call to Conversion, “a clear, detailed, and theologically sophisticated appeal for ecclesial conversion, especially in regard to poverty and war,” but criticizes God’s Politics for being insufficiently theological. She concludes with an ethnographic study of two emerging churches, Eleuthero in Maine... (shrink)

Realists about fictional entities often distinguish the properties that a fictional character has and the properties a character holds. Roughly, this is the distinction between the properties that a character really possesses and the properties it fictionally possess. But despite the popularity of this distinction in realist circles, it gives rise to a number of subtle issues about which fictional realists can and do disagree. In this paper, we aim to clarify these issues and defend three related theses. One: that (...) to say that Hermione holds the property of being female is just to say that the singular proposition ⟨Hermione, being female⟩ is true according to Harry Potter. Two: that ordinary objects can hold properties insofar as propositions like ⟨Napoleon, being French⟩ can be true according to fictions like War and Peace. Three: that the distinction between having and holding should not be thought to play any semantic role within the context of fictional realism. (shrink)

This comprehensive study of probability considers the approaches of Pascal, Laplace, Poisson, and others. It also discusses Laws of Large Numbers, the theory of errors, and other relevant topics.

We reflect on a decade of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a discourse emerging from the European Commission (EC) 10 years ago. We discuss the foundations for RRI, its emergence during the Seventh Framework programme and its subsequent evolution during Horizon 2020. We discuss how an original vision for RRI became framed around five so-called ‘keys’: gender, open access, science communication, ethics and public engagement. We consider the prospects for RRI within the context of the EC’s Open Science agenda (...) and Horizon Europe programme, before closing with some reflections on the contribution RRI has made to debates concerning the relationship between science, innovation and society over the last decade. (shrink)

We reflect on a decade of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a discourse emerging from the European Commission (EC) 10 years ago. We discuss the foundations for RRI, its emergence during the Seventh Framework programme and its subsequent evolution during Horizon 2020. We discuss how an original vision for RRI became framed around five so-called ‘keys’: gender, open access, science communication, ethics and public engagement. We consider the prospects for RRI within the context of the EC’s Open Science agenda (...) and Horizon Europe programme, before closing with some reflections on the contribution RRI has made to debates concerning the relationship between science, innovation and society over the last decade. (shrink)

In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs (...) from the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's “translate-and-deflate” methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think that questions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one. (shrink)

The reviewer welcomes Von Mises' book as a most valuable contribution to the nowadays so badly needed clarifying of philosophical terminology. The author confesses himself to positivism, but his work bears a far more psychological and significal stamp than those of most present positivists.